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Up to the early 1990s, the African communication sphere was regularly placed at the bottom of 
any international evaluation – too little, too urban and too authority-oriented. But then the 
situation changed. New political winds found their expression in the Windhoek Declaration (1991). 
Independent media voices emerged. A little later, a surge of information and communication 
technologies swept over the continent, turning the ambitions towards digital forms of 
communication. The phenomenon has been called the ‘smartphone revolution’. Africans have 
been ensured access to the Internet, and they have entered the modern world.  
 
But is the revolution really a revolution? Problems and contradictions in the mediascape are still 
prevalent, and a Habermasian public sphere is hardly available for anyone other than the urban 
middle and upper classes. Chantal Mouffe (2005) differentiates ‘the political’ and ‘politics’, which 
stands for institutional control and order, while ‘the political’ means individual’s ability to 
antagonism. Is there space for the political in Africa? Arjun Appadurai (1996) has talked about 
imagination turning into social practice in global cultural processes. A prerequisite for such a 
development are social practices designed according to the needs of the society in question. 
However, as indicated in several studies (Berger, 2007; Rioba, 2009), changes in communication 




The aim of this article is to discuss the communication policies and practices in two neighbouring  
African countries, namely in Kenya and Tanzania. The discussion is based on the scrutiny of 
documents and some expert interviews. I defined communication policies as broadly as Freedman, 
2008: 17) ’formal as well as informal strategies, underpinned by specific interests, values and goals 
that shape the emergence of mechanisms designed to structure the direction of and behaviour in 
particular media environments’. I thus consider that actual media behaviour reflects media 
policies, although specific policy statements are not defined. 
 
The empirical material is filtered through four key concepts: collective memory, social imaginary, 
domestication and liminality. My assumption is that the mediascapes in Africa today are moulded 
by the history of the continent. Both deliberate attempts to develop communication and the 
actual media and ICT (information and communications technology) practices reflect the past. 
 
The role of collective memory or social memory – both concepts are used – in media forms and 
practices and have become popular in recent years (e.g. Zelizer & Tenenboim-Wainblatt, 2014). 
The shared history that shapes our perception of ourselves is called social memory. Durkheim 
(1912/1995) noted that societies require continuity and connection with the past to preserve 
social unity and cohesion. Halbwachs (1952/1992) expanded the idea to ‘totems’, commemorative 
events that serve as reminders of a collective memory. Commemorative events reinforce 
memories that fade away without reinforcement. The collective memory is not an accurate 
representation of the past but rather a manipulated construction of those who maintain power in 
society. Some researchers (e.g. Bodnar, 1993) divide collective memory into two types. Vernacular 
memories are said to originate from the people, while official memory is created for the purpose 
of stabilisation of the status quo. Media contents and especially media policies could be viewed as 
vehicles for the reinforcing of official collective memory, while the African oral heritage could be 
assessed as the vernacular dimension.  
 
Collective memory is mostly seen as a ‘container’ of the nation-state. In recent years, attempts 
have been made to remove collective memory from the nation-state dimension to ‘cosmopolitan 
memory’ (e.g. Levy & Sznaider, 2010; Chouliaraki, 2013; Gabel, 2013), with global-local dynamics 
and agency. Especially in this kind of framing, the normative character of collective memory is 
recognised. Social imaginary is a concept reflecting on activities that both set human subjects 
apart from others and also join them. Castoriadis (1975: 224) talks about ‘ the central imaginary 
significations of a society [ ...] are the laces which tie a society together and the forms which 
define what, for a given society, is "real”’. In this text, I try to search those historical laces which 
Sub-Saharan African societies have engraved in their present-day communication. 
 
Domestication is an operational concept for assessing how many genuinely domestic perspectives 
are integrated in cultural phenomena adopted from abroad. Domestication (Silverstone, 1992; 
Helle-Valle & Slettemeås, 2008) is understood as a process of ‘taming’ new media forms or 
technology for use in a particular society. In this article, domestication is used in the meaning of 
‘taming the wild and cultivating the tame’ (Silverstone, 1994: 174). Cultural policy researchers 
have analysed the local adjustment of transnational models. According to them, local activities are 
standardised during a process of domestication, but localism is persistent, bringing into the 
adaptation even ‘banal’ local elements. However, when applied to the field of communication, the 
emergence of local elements is not self-evident. For example, ICT adoption is a rigid process, 
demanding a series of technological solutions. 
 
With the liminality thesis, I try to find out whether the recent plans about communication policies 
have driven Africans to a drastic change in social behaviour and media habits. Liminality is a 
concept used in anthropology (e.g. Turner, 1974) and literary theory to depict a state which is 
situated in between other spaces, periods or identities. The foundational metaphor is ‘threshold’. 
As dawn and dusk hold liminal positions between night and day, liminality defies boundaries and 
erases differences. The usage of the term has broadened to describe political and cultural change. 
During liminal periods, social hierarchies may be reversed or temporarily dissolved, the continuity 
of tradition may become uncertain and future outcomes once taken for granted may be thrown 
into doubt. The claim here is that in the present-day African situation, not only are media and 
communication use changed, but social hierarchies might also become reversed.  
 
My research question is both broad and diffuse. The aim of this article is simply (a) to elaborate on 
the space and forms of social memory found in the media performance and communication ideals 
in Eastern Africa, especially Kenya and Tanzania and (b) to find out what kind of intellectual 
mechanisms are used in such processes. My assumption is that the present-day media 
performances are ‘layered’, a result of a succession of selected elements of social memory. 
Depending on the past, various African mediascapes represent different forms of social imaginary 
today. Jo Helle-Valle (2017) quite justifiably emphasizes that media should not be placed in the 
centre when media use is studied. People’s everyday lives should be the point of departure. 
The reason for selecting Kenya and Tanzania as the targets of the empirical analysis is the fact that 
the two neighbouring countries have both strong similarities and differences. The empirical 
analysis is far from systematic. A ‘proper’ empirical analysis would demand much more than my 
haphazard notions based on careful reading of the documents, which have been part of my 
previous works in the field1. Thus, the following reflections are based on fairly large empirical 
materials. The method used in the empirical analysis for this article is close reading, and the 
emphasis is on the search for theoretical reflections, not details.  
In short, the article provides observations about the East African mediated communication and a 
testing ground for various interpretations which have been maturing in my mind during previous 
work in the field and while reading the piles of documents for this particular study. The number of 
exact references have been minimized, because practically every second sentence would require a 
reference, if the conventional rules of social science research would have followed.  
 
The past: Media from colonisers to colonisers, variation in message modes 
 
The Congo Conference (1884-5) divided the African continent between the colonial powers and 
established the colonial rule in Africa (Sturmer, 1998, p. 9). Colonial powers also influenced the 
development of an authoritarian press concept and the muffling down of indigenous forms of 
communication (e.g. Faringer, 1991; Esipisu & Kariitthi, 2007). The goals were, primarily, to 
provide news and information to European civil servants and business people in the country and, 
only secondly, to promote literacy and rural development plus to counter nationalistic movements 
among Africans. Africans were not the primary audience.  
 
The first African journalism emerged in West Africa, in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Gold Coast 
(now Ghana) in the early 19th century. The first ones were government-owned papers, but soon 
also missionaries and returning freed slaves started to launch papers. According to Faringer 
(1991), the British pursued rather libertarian ideas about the press, while the rule of the French in 
West Africa was closely related to the French culture and its media traditions.  
 
Some researchers (e.g. Burton, 1979) assert that one of the reasons why Britain’s West African 
colonies achieved independence before East Africa was exactly the virile nationalistic press on the 
West coast. East African newspapers were what Faringer (1991, pp. 9–16) calls ‘Africanised’ 
versions of papers established by European interest groups and missionaries. The weak African 
press in East Africa was mainly staffed by politicians, who lacked training in journalism. The quality 
of journalism remained modest although motivation was high. Asians owned the printing presses, 
and Europeans supplied advertising revenue. In addition, the British came to East Africa in great 
numbers, and thus a ‘settler’ press which carried news from Britain found a large audience. 
 
                                                          
1 Kivikuru 2009, Kivikuru 2013, Kivikuru 2015, Kivikuru  2016, Kivikuru 2017. Especially in Kivikuru 2013 and 
2016, Tanzanian mediascape and media policies are analysed, based on historical reviews and quantitative 
content analysis. In Kivikuru 2015, community media are discussed. Kivikuru 2017 comprises an analysis of 
more than 70 Kenyan information policy documents.  
 
The centre of British colonies in East Africa was Kenya, and there especially Mombasa (Faringer 
1991). The press started to flourish there around the turn of the 20th century. Kenya’s register of 
newspapers soon included hundreds of titles, though many were tiny newssheets. Colonial 
authorities, missions but also the business community published newspapers. The present 
dominant Kenyan media groups originate from those years. The first indigenously owned paper 
(Mwigwithania) was launched by the Kikuyu Central Association in 1928, and its role was distinctly 
nationalistic. The editor was Johnstone Kamau, later to be known as Jomo Kenyatta. After the 
Second World War, the African press, operating in various vernacular languages, started to 
mushroom in Kenya. All these papers were nationalist and militant, but circulations remained 
modest. 
 
The situation of Tanzania differed from Kenya, first because of the complicated colonial history of 
Tanganyika—first a German colony, then a British protectorate – and second, because of the two 
totally different media histories of mainland Tanganyika and Zanzibar. A German based newspaper 
law was put into practice in 1912. It had minimal impact on media development, because the 
phase of British protectorate started already in 1916. However, the system of government 
newsletters originates from the German period. (Sturmer, 1998, pp. 42-49) 
 
In Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the development of the press could be described as a story of delay. 
Papers were many but small, both in Dar es Salaam and in Tanga.  They came out in five different 
languages: German, English, Kiswahili, Gujarati and Arabic. During the German phase the settler 
community was kept small, but the situation changed when the British period started. World War 
II meant a strong but short push forward for the Kiswahili press. The government started dozens of 
regional papers in Kiswahili. In the 1950s, these papers occasionally presented mild criticism 
against the colonial masters. (Sturmer, 1998, pp. 30-69) 
 
Kenya became the first British colony to begin regular broadcasts in 1928. In British colonies, the 
structure of broadcasting services was designed along the model of the BBC (Esipisu & Kariitthi, 
2007, p. 35). According to Ansah (1985, pp. 3–15), the programme content was a combination of 
education and news, news for the British in the country and education to help teachers in schools. 
The role of the teachers was to mediate the useful messages to students at schools. As Nyamnjoh 
(2005, pp. 38–46) has said, France and Britain established radio stations to provide their citizens 
with information from home but also to consolidate their position in the colonies and to 
disseminate their values among the ‘natives’.  
 
In sum, the early East African press was divided into European-owned city papers and rural papers 
run by ministries, sometimes in vernacular languages. In addition, missionaries published their 
papers mainly in vernaculars. Soon after the take-off of the press, territories instituted strict laws 
regulating the right of Africans to run newspapers. The idea was to stifle the spread of ‘subversive’ 
political tones in the papers. Francis Nyamnjoh (2005, pp. 40–41) states that the colonised – those 
to be developed via the rural press – were not allowed to determine about what to learn. 
 
The last years of colonialism offered imposed collective memories, created by colonisers and 
claiming that European and African interests were the same. This could be viewed as forced – and 
false – domestication. There were differences between Kenya and Tanganyika. In Kenya, the 
media started to develop fast and some media soon turned commercially successful. As 
everywhere else, emerging business and trade demanded intensified communication. Not only the 
political power controlled the media, but also the business community. However, the distance to 
the ordinary person remained wide.   
 
The rigid control of the media made it difficult for liberation leaders to articulate their anti-colonial 
opinions via the press. Subsequently, during the independence struggle, the media were perceived 
as being secondarily important (Hyden & Okigbo, 2002). Nationalist leaders, planning mass 
movements, ended up with direct communication with the people through political rallies.  
 
In this phase, the weak Tanzanian mediascape appeared slightly more domesticated than the 
Kenyan, but it was also loaded with bureaucracy which did not support the media reality. This was 
a dangerous legacy:  politically, you had to follow orders, but media philosophy you could forget. 
In Kenya, the settler community was larger, offering an audience for the media, which soon 
became financially successful. At this stage, ethnic contradictions remained to a large extent 
outside the mediascape.  The media were predominantly private, while in Tanzania, a variety of 
government organs stood behind the media.  
 
The official social memory was top/down and set by outsiders in both countries. The vernacular 
social memory was predominantly based on individuals’ own experiences and the oral culture 
outside the media sphere. Underground activities and political rallies could function as 
commemorative events, engraved in the collective memory of the people, although they were not 
covered by the media. It can be imagined that the emerging liberation movements created 
liminality among the population at large. Thus far, the colonial rule had given the ordinary person 
only the role of an object. Now s/he was invited to have a voice, via supporting liberation leaders. 
 
Media in nation-building: Great hopes and development but still top/down 
 
Development brings freedom, provided it is development of people. But people cannot be 
developed; they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build 
a man’s house, an outsider cannot give the man pride and self-confidence in himself as a 
human being. Those things a man has to create in himself by his own actions. […] A man 
develops himself by joining in free discussion of a new venture, and participating in the 
subsequent decision; he is not developed if he is herded like an animal into the new venture. 
(Nyerere, 1968, pp. 27–28) 
 
After independence, strong leaders – above all in Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana and Senegal – drafted 
declarations about the role of the media and journalism. In Tanzania, extensive blueprints about 
how the media should be arranged in the future were designed (Ng’wanakilala, 1981, pp. 17-21). 
Nyerere presented his media philosophy in the declaration about the nationalisation of a private 
newspaper, The Standard. As Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Jomo 
Keniatta in Kenya and Leopold Senghor in Senegal designed a significant role for the media in 
social planning.  
 
In fact, the situation turned to the opposite. The weak media had a great role in the struggle for 
independence neither in Kenya nor in Tanzania, and, accordingly, media were considered 
secondary in processes of development also, although they were present in the independence 
rhetoric, for example in the Arusha Declaration (1967) in Tanzania. The emphasis in social planning 
was on very basic issues – economy, education, health, land ownership, plus nation-building and 
Pan-Africanism. Democracy was a frequently used word in official documents and speeches, but it 
remained an abstract term, as did freedom. The only clear principle was that the media were to 
assist in the construction of a new nation. Without exception, broadcasting companies were put 
under government rule and most major newspapers nationalised to ensure the nation-
construction process. In Kenya, the private press survived. 
 
Anti-colonial campaigns were started in Ghana to assist in the political liberation of the African 
countries which were still colonised. The solidarity mode was adopted by East African states, and 
especially strong it became in Tanzania.  
 
The media were given scarce resources in Tanzania to complete its ambitious tasks. The country 
had two dailies and a few weeklies, operating from Dar es Salaam and mainly in English; the 
change compared with the latest stage of colonialism was marked. Television was not allowed on 
mainland Tanzania; it was expected to bring dependency on foreign programmes. Radio was the 
main medium, and it covered the country quite well.   
 
The nationalisation of media companies was put into in full in Tanzania, partly in Kenya. National 
news agencies grew out of the pre-independence information services. In Kenya, the private press 
kept its status though also government communication was strengthened. The Kenyan situation 
was ideologically complex. The dilemma of centralism versus regionalism created debates, and the 
country experienced tension between supporters of a communal or socialist path and proponents 
of more individualised and capitalist approaches. There were competing narratives of history, and 
the media partly reflected them. Thus, there was more space for alternative voices. 
 
Only rarely did policy statements have any real impact on the media reality in the two countries. In 
the name of nation-building, the use of vernaculars in the media was not favoured. In general, the 
main language of the media was the colonial language, considered more neutral than any of the 
vernaculars, which were anticipated to promote tribalism.  
 
Post-colonial governments found it natural to justify why broadcasting needed public control, 
which led to state monopoly in Tanzania. Funding, educational goals and technology were 
frequently used as reasons for keeping broadcasting under state control. Governments claimed 
that once their states had become mature and stable, they would release the grip over 
broadcasting and promote pluralism and diversity. But during the first years of independence, the 
role reserved for broadcasting was to operate as a vehicle of nation-building.  
 
The time was characterised by great hopes and modest accomplishments. Especially in Tanzania, 
the developmentalist state was promoted. In Kenya, there was more operational space for the 
print media. Concerning radio, a variety of creative solutions to increase education in literacy, 
health and agriculture were developed, mainly on national basis but acknowledging the need to 
come closer to the ordinary person. However, within a few years after independence, especially 
Tanzanian mainstream media started to resemble ‘protocol news’, typically working for national 
government priorities. That happened also to a certain extent in Kenya, where the press remained 
predominantly in private hands. 
 
In sum, this phase put a strong emphasis on the imposition of collective memories from above, but 
those manipulating the memories were now domestic leaders. Despite frequent remarks about 
democracy, the first years of independence in the mediascapes of the two republics can hardly be 
called democratic; new leaders developed collective memories mainly based on abstract slogans. 
The role of Pan-Africanism was complex, and it was especially strong in Tanzania. The ideology 
remained abstract in the media, but it certainly created curiosity, perhaps also affection and 
solidarity. Africanism was a new horizon for ordinary Africans, those days keenly tied to their own 
communities. For the liberation movements operating in different countries, the broadcast time 
allowed for them was crucial, the only way to keep contact with their countrymen in diaspora. It 
could be claimed that only through tightly regulated broadcasting could commemorative events 
about Pan-Africanism be organised.  
In East Africa, a specific dimension of African cooperation was the East African Community. Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda had a long history of cooperation under successive regional integration 
arrangements, starting with a customs union in 1917. The first formal round of the East African 
Community started in 1967 and lasted for 10 years. The phase was filled with contradictions and 
accuses of Kenyan dominance, but for the media sphere, the Community meant a start of print 
media cooperation covering all the three countries. Most East African papers had their base in 
Kenya. 
One could imagine that after a few years of independence, with the glory of the struggle gone, 
signs of despair and liminality met the ordinary person. His/her daily life did not change much, and 
the social order in the surroundings remained the same; however, demands for political activity 
and concrete changes in one’s life were promoted by the media, mass organisations and extension 
workers. As such, the suggested political activity was easy, predominantly involving attendance in 
mass meetings, not expressing one’s opinions through the media. The development part was more 
complicated: one was urged to learn to read and write, to change agricultural practices, to eat 
differently and exercise birth control. The Nyamnjoh (2005) dilemma prevailed: those to be 
developed were not allowed to determine the content of what to be informed about. 
 
Radio – also in Kenya, predominantly public radio – was the medium for this phase. Broadcasting 
reached the ordinary person quite well, but it opened only a one-way street, top/own. The 
broadcasting did its best to create commemorative events, especially in Tanzania, where the 
nation-building and development rhetoric was stronger than in Kenya with tensions among ethnic 
groups. Attempts to localization via radio fora were made, but they were not successful. Nation-
building preached for uniformity. In Tanzania, the demand was stronger. However, the dominant 
party paper in Tanzania differed politically from the government paper; the relationship was 
occasionally quite complicated. Kiswahili had a role in developmental broadcasting. 
 
Measured by volume, East African media did not grow much during the first decades of 
independence, but the tone differed distinctly from previous media content. The role given to the 
media was in Tanzania strongly developmental, in Kenya, the private media were interested also in 
economy and politics. Still, the media mainly gave space to the elites – now national elites. In this 
phase, the Tanzanian media – still very weak – made a quick and dramatic turn from a scattered 
multi-lingual mediascape to English-language dominance, while in Kenya, there was much more 
continuity. The Tanzanian case appears as far more contradictory. In Zanzibar, calls for continuity 
and uniformity were even stronger than in the mainland. Thus, the delicate media question was 
deliberately left outside union matters, when the union of the two was established. Accordingly, 
the mediascapes remained divided.  
 
One-party and SAP: Multiple media but placed in the margins  
 
By 1970, the major newspapers across the African continent were government-owned. Only South 
Africa, Kenya and Nigeria accommodated private press. It has been said that in Africa, a ‘culture of 
silence’ was re-imposed by military dictatorships or autocratic one-party states. Towards the 
1980s, a change was emerging, via private radio stations and papers. In the late 1980s, a number 
of new commercial media wiped over the continent, although audience figures remained limited, 
and the change did not extend beyond urban areas.  
As contradictory as it might sound, at the same time the period meant the deterioration of the 
role of the media. The optimism of nation-building years was gone, the results of successful 
development were few and bureaucracy grew. Big clumsy public broadcasting companies could 
not compete in popularity with private stations which played western popular music. National 
pride was a factor promoting television in Kenya. Its emergence – public and private television 
alike -- developed a growing demand for programmes, and programmes were expensive to 
produce. The dependency on foreign supplies Nyerere had warned about became a reality.  
With weakening economies across the continent, Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) became 
crucial for African states, Kenya and Tanzania included. For Tanzania, the situation was especially 
harsh.  During the 1980s, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) attached 
conditions to their loans to countries in economic trouble. The loan packages for Sub-Saharan 
countries included the condition that the governments accepted SAP. SAP did not pay attention to 
media or public information at all. (Etta, 2005) 
The professional education of journalists started in those days. Curricula were copied from 
institutions in the former colonial states, and young Africans received scholarships for studies in 
the West. Textbooks as well as journalistic ideals were adopted from the previous colonial masters 
(Golding & Elliott, 1979). The debate around the New World Information and Communication 
Order (NWICO) was heated in the international arenas in Paris and New York, but East African 
media and journalists did not yet recognise that war as theirs. 
In sum, the period in question offers an ambitious task for an analyst. On one hand, some space 
was opening for a variety of opinions because of the expansion of private media. Critical tones 
were often extended to extremes, and muffled scandals from the past were publicised especially 
in Tanzania, where the media control had been tight. On the other hand, the dominant modes of 
journalism were still reporting on government affairs, development projects and the doings of 
leaders. (Konde, 1984) 
An interesting trait was the downfall of Pan-Africanism. Public radio companies still gave air space 
for southern African liberation movements but with decreased volumes. With the exception of the 
defunct East African Community area, Kenyans and Tanzanians did not know much about what 
was happening in the neighbouring countries. There was no longer space for a social imaginary 
about Pan-Africanism.  
East Africanism experienced a new start, officially in 1999 and Rwanda and Burundi gradually 
joining the group, but the negotiations began already in the mid-1980s. Now Tanzania became the 
dominant state in the Union, mainly due to its large population and vested interests. The 
headquarters were placed in Arusha, Tanzania. However, the objectives of the second round have 
been more modest than in the first phase. The Union has been successful as a customs union, 
while the deeper regional integration process remains marginal. In the media sphere, joint 
exercises in the field of print media continued and developed, based on private interests. A joint 
East African Anthem was officially accepted as late as in 2010. Somehow, the domestication of 
even limited Africanism did not appear significant.    
Another ‘order’ emerged from outside the mediascape. With worsening economies, political 
leaders were forced to put their focus on the direction which was demanded by the World Bank 
and the IMF. The media were not considered important for national macro-economy and, 
accordingly, especially the Tanzanian media operated with very scarce resources. They were again 
pushed in the margins of social development.  
An interesting dimension for this period was the professional sphere, which was not at all 
domesticated. Professional ideals and journalistic training found their contents from abroad, and a 
clash between ‘true’ professionalism and newsroom reality was distinct. Accordingly, among 
professionals the lack of media freedom was anchored to the politics of the country even when 
economy could have been accused. National governments inherited the controller role which 
earlier belonged to the colonial masters. Toward the end of the 1980s, the political control of the 
media was loosening in Tanzania, while in Kenya the space for discussion expanded carefully. The 
growing private media had continuous fights with the government, but despite big headlines, the 
disagreements did not much affect the media activity. In Tanzania and especially in Zanzibar, 
banning of newspapers continued. 
Present past and present: New rhetoric, new dimensions, limited scale 
The 1990s brought radical changes to African mediascapes. Countries governed by one dominant 
party changed to multi-party systems, and the media started to expound a strong rhetoric of 
freedom. Private media emerged everywhere and easily found foreign support – radio stations 
and small-circulation publications most frequently called ‘independent’ instead of ‘private’ or 
‘commercial’, as they would have been called in Europe. The Windhoek Declaration (1991) 
became a symbol of the new era, placing democracy and freedom of expression entirely in the 
sphere of private media. The change was dramatic in Tanzania, but touched also Kenya. In 
Tanzania, a merry-go-round of journalists leaving public media and joining new private media 
created a professional chaos. 
 
A new form of public communication received easily foreign funding: community media. 
Community radio seemed to represent democracy, participation and developmental interests at 
the local level – everything that had been missing. Foreign donors, feeling uneasy about dealing 
with state apparatuses, gladly invested in small studios; after the investment, the medium was 
expected to operate without money on a voluntary basis. In Zambia, South Africa and Ghana, 
community media have flourished.  Both in Kenya and Tanzania, they got started, but have not 
really taken off. There are exceptions, in radically different cultures like in Tanzania in the Masai 
areas, in Kenya in other tribal areas demanding recognition. However, community media operated 
and still operate isolated from the rest of the media.  
 
In Kenya, the Media Complaints Commission has finally taken off, while in Tanzania, the Media 
Council (MCT) has operated well for more than 15 years. It has a recognized status in the media 
circles.  Instead, the connection to ordinary citizens still remains distant. The difference is quite 
interesting, perhaps a reflection of the dramatic change in the media climate in Tanzania. 
 
 In the two countries, media titles have multiplied, but circulation and coverage have not grown 
proportionately, especially in Tanzania. On a systems level, the media mode inherited from 
previous phases of social history changes slowly. The old mode often reproduces itself in new 
media titles even though these titles claim to follow a different logic. The media still tend to focus 
on capital cities and major financial centres, and they still tend to follow political leaders’ activities 
in detail.  
 
However, something has changed in conventional journalism: the language used in the media has 
received attention. Most often, the debate has been limited to broadcasting, which has been more 
directly under public control. In Ethiopia, the increased use of Amharic has been fiercely resisted, 
while in Kenya and Tanzania, Kiswahili is considered ‘ethnically neutral’. However, despite the 
experienced national unity and mobilisation factor, the position of Kiswahili has not been 
promoted in Kenya to the same extent as in Tanzania, where 85–90% of the media now use 
Kiswahili. (Musau, 1999) The situation in Kenya is interesting: in radio and television, the language 
policy appears relaxed, while the ‘serious’ dailies stick to English. The language is not their only 
elite characteristic – also the news criteria indicate that the papers talk to those in power. 
 
The use of Kiswahili is start for voicing (Couldry, 2010), because the population now understands 
what the media are talking about. Not only the language has changed but the vocabulary as well. 
Tabloids tend to use simple, concrete words and straightforward phrases. As Martín-Barbéro 
(1997) has pointed out, light media products teach people how to ‘walk in the city’ – that is, to 
find one’s function in an urban environment. Tanzanian Kiswahili tabloids operate as urban guides. 
On the other hand, a limitation of the strong national language is its firewall character. With the 
exception of Kenya, Tanzanians are today more culturally isolated from its neighbours than before. 
 
After the first boom of freedom rhetoric, totally new forms of mediated expression started to 
emerge in the mediascapes. Their tone is light and entertaining even though the message might 
be serious, even oppositional – this is new in East Africa.  
 
A form of development-related entertainment is the caricature, which is strong both in Kenya and 
Tanzania (Gathara & Wanjau, 2009). In Tanzania, Kiswahili rap, Bongo Flava, has been popular for 
a long time, but recently it has also spread to neighbouring countries (Stroeken, 2005). In Uganda, 
young broadcasters calling themselves ‘rap-orters’ are changing the way news is delivered with a 
weekly television bulletin, NewzBeat on NTV2. NewzBeat discusses ‘difficult’ themes such as 
corruption, homosexuality, AIDS or political opposition. In Uganda as in Kenya and Tanzania, the 
youth population takes little interest in public affairs, but the programme has become popular.  
 
Rap has increasing access in both urban and rural areas in East Africa. Politicians release rap music 
before elections. Verses of protest blast from the speakers of music shops and commuter vans. 
‘People of all ages share with Kiswahili rappers the satisfaction of expressing themselves on a 
variety of problems’, says Stroeken (2005). Besides rap, phone-in programmes also provide the 
ordinary person a route to express him/herself, and people no longer have difficulty in identifying 
themselves on air (Gekao, personal interview, 2015). 
 
                                                          
2 NTV is a private television company in Kampala. It is a subsidiary of Nation Media Group. 
The African mobile phone revolution has received much attention especially in Kenya. Almost  
two-thirds of the population has access to the internet (Communications Authority of Kenya) – 
how regular that is, is another thing, but radio listening has, to a large extent, moved from radio 
set to mobile phones, and online services are available for the common person. Ironically as such, 
the most successful ICT based projects in the African ICT hub so far have taken off as private 
initiatives, without government policy statements. M-Pesa allows people to command their 
money fluently with a mobile phone, Totohealth improves their possibility to get better health 
care. Ushahidi is an open source project which was started after the post-election demonstrations 
in Kenya but operates today globally. It allows users to crowdsource crisis information via the 
mobile phone. However, one government-initiated service has taken off well: Huduma Centres. 
They are county-based ‘one-stop shops’ to access and pay for government services electronically.  
 
 ICT based services are strongly supported by the Kenyan government, while the media sphere is 
taken with care.  Media development has remained separate from national ICT policies, although 
media and the ICT are under the same ministry. Of course, big media companies have of their own 
initiative established websites, opened blogs and discussion columns as well as SMS pages. 
However, the potential of digitality has not been used much for expanding local coverage in the 
media (Kandie, personal information, 2015).  
 
A reason for the public carefulness perhaps is that the online culture has grown in significance 
especially in cities. It has been said that the mobilisation of the demonstrations after 2007 
elections was partly made with SMS messages and the social media (Mäkinen & Kuira, 2008), and 
more recently, some protests have become symbols of social media culture and online resistance 
in Kenya. Social media sites have played a significant role in such – mainly Nairobi-based – protests 
as ‘Occupy parliament’, ‘My dress my choice’, and ‘Occupy playground’.  
 
In all the above aspects, Tanzania represents a totally different case. Internet access hardly 
reaches to one-third of the population, and although there are online groups especially in cities, 
their significance is minimal – M-Pesa is largely used though. Diaspora citizens are able to follow 
online versions of newspapers and radio and TV stations, but there is not much tolerance toward 
online activism. It has frequently become a target of authorities following in detail formulations of 
the Tanzania's Electronic and Postal Communications Act (2010). Criticising the president or 
supporting homosexuality brings individuals easily to court both in mainland and in Zanzibar.  
 
In sum, representatives of the conventional mediascapes in Africa tend to claim that everything 
has changed since the 1990s. This is not true, because the reach of the media is still quite limited 
and urban. However, more space has been given to the social imaginary and people’s own voices 
(Couldry, 2010). Although the voices still predominantly belong to the privileged, they also belong 
to the youth. This means that a liminality dimension is emerging – the youth has a pinched voice in 
a culture which traditionally respects seniors. The ‘born free’ generations are generally not 
interested in public issues. Consequently, the social media and rap might become important.   
However, more conventional forms of journalism have also become more inclusive due to 
tabloidisation. In the Kiswahili region, the journalistic culture has with changed language and 
vocabulary reached the ordinary person. As in South Africa, the boom of tabloid journalism could 
be seen as supporting democracy and expanding media freedom (Wasserman, 2010). Surprisingly, 
localism has not grown much in the media landscape. 
 
Online activity has brought a new dimension of self-expression in Kenyan urban communities, and 
in the long run, the ICT based services can be expected to strengthen citizenship. The aim of 
Huduma Centres  is to help people living outside the cities, also cut bureaucracy and corruption. 
Increased transparency could be expected to strengthen people’s interest in public matters, 
although they do not help village people, living far away from the nearest Huduma. (Wynche & 
nal, 2013) Markers of liminality can be traced. The digital divide is now inside the country, in the 
different options offered to urban and rural areas and different generation groups. In addition, the 
introduction of the mobile phone and M-Pesa also have created micro and macro dichotomies, 
challenging culture-based practices (Komen, 2015, 2016). 
 
The mainstream journalism culture in Kenya has been a ‘beacon of political change and truth-
telling’, allowing dissidence but also talking to those in power. Because of the multiple ties 
between politics, economy and journalism the media tend to bring journalism toward ‘the silence 
of the lambs’, according to some critics. (Namu, 2016; State of the Media in Kenya, 2015) 
However, the difference compared with neighbouring Tanzania is marked.    
 
Tanzania is lagging behind in the application of ICT based activities, and simultaneously, the media 
sphere remains chaotic. Media institutions are many, and the majority operate in the language 
which the people command. The media use big headlines in its fight against corruption, but 
mainstream media based political debates are both rare and careful. The tabloids shout loud 
about ‘accepted’ problems, but a deeper analysis is missing. 
 
There is an interesting contradiction in the development of mainstream media between the two 
countries. In a rough assessment, Tanzanian print media – noisy tabloids – get closer to the 
common person, while especially public broadcasting talks to the elites. In Kenya, the oppose 
takes place: the English-language newspapers with their strong emphasis on politics and economy 
focus on the elites, while popular radio and television with their varying-quality programmes and a 
language mix reach better to the common person. The print media have in recent years lost their 
readership, but this is partly a global trend. In Tanzania, readership statistics is not available, and it 
would be difficult to conclude much based on readership figures, because the field is so unstable. 
 
The community media concentrate on a ‘voice to the voiceless’ ideology. Undoubtedly, 
community media could increase the social imaginary and interest in the political over the long 
run, but community media tend to exercise mini-scale conventional journalism with weak 
resources – but they also end up advocating harsh political causes as in some Kenyan cases. (Ogola 
2015) Also the strong emphasis on education decreases interest. Over the years, African media 
have tried to ‘teach’ the African people so frequently that, although the composition is different in 
community media, the messages sound top/down again. 
 
All in all, the present East African mediascapes allow considerably more space for the social 
imaginary, whereas it seems much more difficult to exercise genuine domestication. The 
communication sphere in Kenya is considerably more close to expanded social imaginary but still 
on its tiptoes about political opinion, while the Tanzanian mediascape is both limited, 
contradictory and out of focus, although in the language sphere domesticated.  
 
Knocking on the doors of knowledge society 
 
On a continent still saddled with a scarcity of communication modes, the emergence of ICT has 
seemed to offer a multitude of digital platforms for citizen participation. Some countries such as 
Kenya have already announced themselves as regional ICT hubs, and their governments have 
started both to plan ICT policies and to search for financial support for implementation. Indeed, 
today Kenya’s Internet penetration reaches to 81% of the population, while in the whole of Africa, 
the average remains under 30% and in Tanzania far below the African average. 
(http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm) A real boom of policy documents has been 
formulated over the past 15–20 years.  
 
 At the crossroads (2005) covers the results of a project on Kenya ICT policy. The project, called 
‘Development El Dorado’, did not succeed, and several authors try to find reasons for the failures 
and delays. There does not seem to be any reason for challenging the necessity of ICT 
development as such; the focus is on how to make it as smooth as possible.  
Florence Etta (2005) claims that African policymaking is today less ‘home-grown’ than in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The main reasons for the lack of independent politics are SAP programmes. 
Simultaneously, with weakening economies, new technology emerged as a magic vehicle for 
improving services and strengthening democracy. Information and communication technology 
appears difficult to resist – but it requires resources. ‘In no other of contemporary endeavour is 
the influence of donors more evident than in ICT policy planning. Most policy work […] has been or 
is being funded by donors’, says Etta (2005, p. 9). Thus the planning of ICT policies has become a 
top/down project, partly thanks to donors and partly because the ICT has been understood as a 
technological project, implemented in the same way all over the world. 
Survey on ICT and Education in Africa (2007) is based on 53 country reports. According to it, Africa 
is reaching a new phase, moving from projects to policies. Kenya is approaching the peak group of 
South Africa, Cameroon, Ghana, Mauritius and Botswana. Tanzania belongs to the laggards. The 
most important macro trends are multi-partnerships that involve private companies, open source 
software and a multiplicity of regional initiatives concerning e-schools and collaborative learning 
projects.  
Over the past 10–15 years, it has been emphasised that the mobile phone has changed the quality 
of life in Sub-Saharan countries. The mobile phone is considered important for economic growth, 
marketing and the provision of services (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). However, the authors warn that 
mobile phone technology cannot serve as the ‘silver bullet’ for development. Mobile phone 
technology must work in partnership with other public good provisions and investments; alone it 
does not create social change.  
Interestingly, documents by Kenyan institutions tend to be more critical about the implementation 
of ICT technology than donor reports (e.g. SIDA’s ICTs for Democracy, 2009). Donors talk about 
‘risks’, ‘challenges’ and ‘uneven developments’, but the basic tone is encouraging and positive. 
The SIDA report elaborates on good governance and freedom of speech as a dimension of 
democracy, thus reflecting Nordic discussions around development. The facts have been collected 
via country reports from Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. In the case of Kenya, the SIDA report states 
that the greatest challenge is the fact that ICT development is driven by private business, not the 
state or the citizenry. The report also notes the difference between the population in cities and in 
rural locales. However, the report sees in Kenya a chance for basic social changes. The society runs 
debates about how to promote ICT, while in Tanzania and Uganda, such an activity is minimal.  
All ICT activity has this far occurred in English, because ICT vehicles have been adopted as 
packages. However, recently the ICT department of the Kenyan Ministry of Information, 
Communication and Technology has started plans to introduce the use of dominant local 
languages at Huduma Centres (Getao, personal communication, 2015). The plans have aroused 
concern about tribalism – the violent political clashes after the 2007 elections are fresh in people’s 
minds. 
 
In sum, the tone in the blueprints regarding ICT resembles policy documents from the 1960s, 
when new democracies advocated for the cause of development. Development was assumed to 
be understood in the same way everywhere. In the ICT blueprints, the significance of ICT is never 
challenged, and some of the plans – for example, the digitalisation of the whole school system in 
Kenya – are unrealistic. However, more than in the 1960s, internal criticism about implementation 
is also explicit.  
From the perspective of social memory, the documents do not offer much. Citizens are most often 
called ‘targets’, ‘customers’ or ‘grassroots’ if they are mentioned at all. From this perspective, the 
slogan ‘mobile phone revolution’ appears misleading. There is no intimacy between the suggested 
revolution and the citizen, and in fact, the citizen is not directly invited to participate in the 
revolution. S/he is only provided with a variety of tools and vehicles. Yes, radio listening in Kenya 
has moved to the mobile phone. On one hand, this has supported the status of radio although 
television is expanding in towns; on the other, it has individualised radio listening, which 
previously was a community-based exercise. 
Obijiofor (2015, pp. 249–251) emphasises that citizen activity and personal responsibility might 
bring into the picture liminal tendencies, a dramatic somersault of values – from community to 
individualism. However, perhaps the emphasis on services shows successful domestication. A 
Kenyan ICT planner feels that it is natural that the profile of progress is different in Kenya than in 
industrialised countries. Kenya proceeds with basic services, while the industrialised world can 
afford to invest in more abstract forms of knowledge society (Getao, personal communication, 
2015). Easy money transfer, fast driving licence applications and less corruption can make a real 
change in the quality of life of people far from cities. On the other hand, a strong emphasis on 
citizen activism undoubtedly sounds dangerous in a society with political contradictions.  
Another issue which has been discussed in recent years (e.g. Akinbobola, 2015; Kandie, personal 
communication, 2015) is the question of why ICT has been developed separately from media 
planning, both in Kenya and in Tanzania. ICT could strengthen the media in aspects which have 
thus far been weak: in decreasing top/down reporting, in spreading out from cities, in localising 
and in giving voice to the voiceless. Akinbobola’s examples from West Africa are not very 
promising from the perspective of mobile phone revolution, however. He anticipates that the 
radio, not social media, will also in the future be the main mass medium in Africa.  
Conclusive remarks 
The above impressions about the Eastern African mediascapes do not promise much operational 
space for Mouffe’s ‘the political’ (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 48–52). Her elegant criticism of consensual 
democracy and proposals of radicalisation do not fit too well with the developments in the East 
African public sphere. Mouffe tends to invest in state institutions. So does East African politics; but 
Mouffe’s perception of democracy is processual, without moments of discontinuity, while 
especially the Tanzanian social developments over the past 50–60 years have been characterised 
by sharp turns and discontinuities. Kenya fits better in the Mouffe considerations, although also 
there are disjunctures embedded – actually more deep going than in Tanzania.  
If a somewhat vulgar interpretation is allowed, one could claim that Mouffe’s democracy is based 
on tensions and negotiations between state institutions and individuals, who, of course, in turn, 
might belong to various groups. The will of the state is mediated via a complex set of actors in 
politics, education, the economy and the media. In Africa, the social order is characterised by 
negotiations between authorities – dominantly state institutions, partly others – and communities. 
The media do not represent the citizens, because they reach only to a limited part of the 
population on a regular basis. The media have been controlled and regulated, but they have also 
deliberatively adopted the same tone as the decision-making that is top/down and lacking 
negotiation.  
The counter-force to top/down politics in Eastern Africa is the community, togetherness. In 
Kenyan urban settings, the community is partly becoming virtual, but the community still exists. In 
Tanzania, the community axis is stronger, but so is also the state. The role of the media as 
representatives of the citizen communities is weak; despite the headline rhetoric, the media tend 
to attach more to the state. 
The laces that tie the society together that Castoriadis (1975, p. 224) talks about are easy to 
distinguish in Kenyan and Tanzanian societies and in the mediascapes that reflect the social 
memory. The laces are predominantly authoritarian. But has the imagination turned into social 
practice as Appadurai (1996) requires? A prerequisite for such a development are social practices 
designed according to the needs of the society in question. The perhaps most astonishing aspect 
of the governments and the media in both of the East African societies is the fact that locality has 
not taken off. The dangers experienced during nation-building have a long shadow.   
Accordingly, it is perhaps best to discard Mouffe and Appadurai. Instead, I try to interpret 
Galtung’s (1999) considerations. He has introduced a picture of the relationships between three 
actors in society: the state, the market and civil society (Figure 1). According to Galtung, the ideal 
place for the media would be in the middle of the three, receiving and sending messages to all. But 
the author admits that this is rarely the case; the media tend to attach to the state or the market, 
more rarely to civil society.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
 
Interpreted through African evidence, the media have been close to the state, in Kenya close and 
in Tanzania, very close. Now there is a recognisable move, in Kenya a move towards civil society 
but simultaneously and more strongly towards the market. In Tanzania, the move is recognizable 
but weaker – in fact, the move toward the civil society is quite weak as long as conventional media 
are concerned.  
In this process, ICT has a crucial role. The mobile phone revolution opens doors but is financially 
controlled to a large extent by the market. There is not much space for domestication. However, 
the avoidance of localisation cannot alone be explained money. It goes deeper in history and its 
contradictions. African societies are layered as American sandwiches. But the civil society is also 
changing. Traditions are weakening and getting compensated by communities following other 
logic. Individualism is preached by rappers as well as community radio agitators. In this sense, 
both societies are in a liminal stage or approaching it.  
An addition should be made to Galtung’s figure: the media ball in the middle should be 
considerably smaller. The political order in East African societies has demanded obedience from 
the side of the media for decades. The main reason is the modest size of the mediascape. In 
societies such as Kenya where the media have a long history of diversity and sizable volume it has 
been easier to invest in a multiplicity of voices. The size of the society is not always decisive: the 
country that has for years been number one on the continent in media freedom indexes is 
Namibia.  Quite interestingly, the values of a debating mediascape were inherited from apartheid 
South Africa, and the media participated in the liberation struggle. The transition to independence 
was not smooth, but a history of dialogue now allows participatory radio programmes, creates 
SMS pages even in government publications and drives the media ombudsman system to 
sustainable performance.  
East Africa has a long way to go. Binyavanga Wainaina (2008, p. 17) has assessed Kenyan 
journalism in the following way: ‘Our media is obsessed with the soap opera of political 
characters. So Kenya is really just a theatre-screen where we watch a few people play drama 
games on stage, and clap, or cry or laugh.’ Kenyan media publicity is an elite exercise. Today, a 
part of the clapping or laughing audience operates online, but citizens still remain as an audience. 
As undemocratic and unfair as this sounds, societies with a relatively strong media history seem to 
have a shorter way to find a balance between top/down and bottom/up tensions in the future 
mediascape. The social imaginary requires time to develop. On the other hand, ICT poses a 
challenge to both Kenya and Tanzania. It is justified to determine that the emphasis on services is 
right, because so much is missing in this dimension, especially in the rural areas and poor suburbs. 
But if decision-makers do not admit that they also are concerned about the potential of citizen 
activism coming with social media and radical websites, they are not being honest. Many decision-
makers have inherited an oversized social memory of unrest and disorder, and this is why ICT has 
been kept separate from media policies.  
An additional dimension to the challenges is the role of media languages. They are double totems 
of history in regard to present decisions. They represent colonialism but also tribalism. In 
Tanzania, the state has chosen Kiswahili and thus the media dare to speak the people’s language, 
although groups using other vernaculars say that Kiswahili kills their culture. On the other hand, 
Kiswahili is a ‘national glue’ for tribal contradictions. Carol Myers-Scotton (e.g. 1971) has shown in 
her intriguing sociolinguistic studies about African multilingualism, how complicated language 
choices are not only for decision-makers but also for the social identity of people. Tanzania is a 
nation to a higher degree than Kenya. People belong to tribes but they mainly represent social 
memory, belonging and security. The careful proceeding toward Kiswahili in Kenya tells that 
tensions between English, Kiswahili and other local languages continue.  Frequently tribe-based 
contradictions emerge also in the state machinery and politics. It is perhaps justified to say that 
Kenya is more a state than a nation, more advanced than Tanzania as a state, but including ethnic 
contradictions which do not represent security alone. Kenya appears more as a top/down society, 
effective but distant for the individual citizen.  
All African societies have several social orders on the top of each other but compositions differ. 
For successful media policies, they should be included in one way or the other.  In Tanzania, the 
biggest challenge for policymakers is to get the system running, because there is a long tradition of 
ignoring policy statements. In Kenya, the challenge is more complicated. The system should allow 
the ordinary person to step in the media landscape more properly than today. The state is 
running, the media are running, but there are quite a few contradictory elements in the social 
memory. The social media are not necessarily helping in this aspect. As journalist Steve Omondi 
(The Nation Nov.30, 2016) says, social media are the digital forest of mediocrity. 
The braiding of the social memory and social imaginary cannot succeed without voices that speak 
the language that the people understand, but diversity of cultures should also flourish – and the 
challenge of globalisation exercises extra pressure. Social media alone hardly bring a solution to 
this problem. In the African circumstances, public radio could probably best operate as a flagship 
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